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ADMIRALTY-COLLISION-LAST CLEAR CHANCE-The City of Calcutta an-
chored in the navigation channel as an emergency precaution on a foggy 
night. The vessel was hit by a scow in tow of the tug Brooklyn, whose navi-
gator had observed the anchored ship for ten minutes. The scow sank and 
its owner sought to hold the City of Calcutta liable for failure to get under-
way after the fog had lifted. Held, libel dismissed. Even if the Calcutta 
was remiss in not moving, no liability could attach because the Brooklyn 
had the last clear chance of avoiding the accident. Arundel Corp. v. The 
City of Calcutta, (E.D. N.Y. 1958) 172 F. Supp. 593. In another case, libel-
lant's two tugs were trying to free their grounded barge by weaving and 
swinging across the navigation channel. Respondent's tug collided with the 
barge in an attempt to pass the other two tugs. The district court divided 
the damages equally because libellant was at fault in blocking the channel 
and respondent was at fault in trying to pass without signals when the 
danger was clear. On appeal by libellant, held, decree affirmed. Last clear 
chance is applicable in admiralty but not where the negligence of both 
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parties continues up to the moment of the accident. Cenac Towing Co. v. 
Richmond, (5th Cir. 1959) 265 F. (2d) 466. 
Last clear chance developed in the common law to mitigate the severe 
rule that contributory negligence completely barred a plaintiff from re-
covery.1 In admiralty contributory negligence does not bar an injured 
party, but results in an equal division of damages. Therefore some ad-
miralty courts have considered last clear chance inapplicable.2 But division 
of damages holds the only slightly negligent party to his full share of the 
damages, a result which has been criticized as unnecessarily harsh.3 Under 
these circumstances last clear chance would seem a proper means to exon-
erate the slightly negligent party. However, admiralty courts in applying 
last clear chance have rarely given this reason, but as in the City of Calcutta 
case have applied the rule simply on the basis of common law authority.4 
So long as some justification exists in terms of mitigation it is difficult to 
quarrel with these decisions.cs But when damages can be apportioned 
according to the degree of fault no justification remains for the continued 
use of last clear chance.6 Yet American non-admiralty courts which can 
apportion damages have not been unanimous in rejecting last clear chance.7 
The continued application of the rule is attributable to the idea that the 
rule is one of proximate cause; the person who had the last clear chance 
of avoiding the accident is said to be the sole cause of the injury and is 
therefore responsible for all damages.8 The same result has been reached 
in some English admiralty cases decided after passage of the Maritime 
Convention Act,9 which requires apportionment of damages.10 These 
1 See James, "Last Clear Chance: A Transitional Doctrine," 47 YALE L.J. 704 (1938); 
MacIntyre, "The Rationale of Last Clear Chance," 53 HAR.v. L. R.Ev. 1225 (1940). 
2Williamson v. The Carolina, (E.D. N.C. 1958) 158 F. Supp. 417; The Norman B. 
Ream, (7th Cir. 1918) 252 F. 409. 
8 See Tank Barge Hygrade v. Gatco New Jersey, (3d Cir. 1957) 250 F. (2d) 485; 
Oriental Trading &: Transport Co. v. Gulf Oil Corp., (2d Cir. 1949) 173 F. (2d) 108; 
Socony Vacuum Transportation Co. v. Gypsum Packet Co., (2d Cir. 1946) 153 F. (2d) 773. 
Except for the United States all leading maritime countries have adopted the maritime 
convention which provides for comparative negligence. 
4 Crawford v. Indian Towing Co., (5th Cir. 1957) 240 F. (2d) 308; The Sanday, (2d 
Cir. 1941) 122 F. (2d) 325; The Wattupa, (2d Cir. 1941) 120 F. (2d) 766. See Cooper, 
"The Last Clear Chance Doctrine Is Applicable in Admiralty," 5 N.Y. I.Aw FoRuM 278 
(1959); Witsaman, "Last Clear Chance in Admiralty," 10 WEST. RE.s. L. R.Ev. 286 (1959). 
See also the discussion of the reasons underlying the use of last clear chance in admiralty 
in Cenac Towing Co. v. Richmond, (5th Cir. 1959) 265 F. (2d) 466. 
~An exception is Kosnac v. Norcuba, (S.D. N.Y. 1956) 142 F. Supp. 377, where last 
clear chance was applied in order to divide the damages. This is clearly out of line with 
the cases which use last clear chance to exonerate one negligent party and throw the total 
loss on the other. The case was reversed on the ground that there was in fact no last clear 
chance and therefore no liability; Kosnac v. Norcuba, (2d Cir. 1957) 243 F. (2d) 890. 
6 See Prosser, "Comparative Negligence," 51 MICH. L. R.Ev. 465 (1953). 
7 Cases are collected in 59 A.L.R. (2d) 1261 (1958). 
8 Lovett v. Sandersville R. Co., 72 Ga. App. 692, 34 S.E. (2d) 644 (1945); Chicago, M., 
St. P. &: P.R. Co. v. Kane, (9th Cir. 1929) 33 F. (2d) 866. 
9 I &: 2 Geo. 5, c. 57 (19ll). 
10 The Kate, [1936] 54 LIL. Rep. 120; Anglo-Newfoundland Development Co. v. 
Pacific S.N. Co., [1924] A.C. 406. 
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English cases11 have noted the striking similarity between a ship negli-
gently anchored in a navigation channel and the hobbled donkey in the 
road in Davies v. Mann,1 2 cited as the origin of the last clear chance 
doctrine. Neither ship nor donkey can avoid the impending collision; each 
is at the mercy of the moving object, which having seen the danger must 
take steps to avoid it. Failure to take such steps results in sole liability.13 
The exoneration of one negligent party in a comparative negligence juris-
diction should not, however, be made to rest on the application of a 
mechanical rule of proximate cause like last clear chance. A study of 
American, English and Canadian cases14 shows, nevertheless, that where 
comparative negligence is imposed upon the courts by legislation, there 
has been a marked unwillingness to dispense with last clear chance.115 
Therefore, since a rational application of comparative negligence in ad-
miralty seems desirable, two alternatives are available. Either the United 
States adopts the maritime convention with the understanding that the 
courts will no longer apply last clear chance, or the district courts judicially 
adopt comparative negligence in admiralty and simultaneously discard last 
clear chance. Since adoption of the maritime convention seems unlikely,16 
the district courts are urged to proceed with the second alternative. Doubt 
has been expressed about whether the lower courts have the power to put 
an end to the equal division rule.17 But damage awards in admiralty are 
based upon enlarged principles of justice and equity and are within the 
discretion of the district court.18 In addition to permitting equal division 
11 The Kate, note IO supra; The Eurymedon, [1938] P. 41. Cases are collected and 
discussed in MARSDEN, COLLISIONS AT SEA, 10th ed., 21-34 (1953). 
12 10 M. &: W. 546, 152 Eng. Rep. 588 (1842). 
13 This same result was reached without the benefit of last clear chance in a French 
case where a trawler collided with a sailing vessel preparing to fish on a windless night 
without required lights. Since the sailing vessel had been sighted her negligence was not 
considered directly related to the collision. Cameleyre v. Leduc, D.H. 1928.317. Lawson 
comments upon this case as follows: "Although I am inclined to think it is in accord with 
the policy of the new [Law Reform (Contributory Negligence)] Act that the search for a 
last clear chance should entirely cease, I am bound to refer, not only to the statement 
of Esmein to the effect that French courts often neglect a slight negligence of one of the 
parties-which would not in itself be hostile to my thesis-but also to the case Cameleyre 
v. Leduc, which might be called the French Davies v. Mann." LAWSON, NEGLIGENCE IN THE 
CIVIL LAW 57 (1950). 
14 Cases from all three countries are discussed in 59 A.L.R. (2d) 1261 (1958). For spe-
cific countries, see Prosser, "Comparative Negligence," 51 MICH. L. REv. 465 (1953); Mac-
Intyre, "Last Clear Chance After Thirty Years Under the Apportionment Statutes," 33 CAN. 
B. REv. 257 (1955); Lord Wright, "Contributory Negligence," 13 MoD. L. REY. 2 (1950); 
Goodhart, "The Last Opportunity Rule," 65 L. Q. REv. 237 (1949). 
15 Especially the experience under the Federal Employers Liability Act shows the 
unwillingness of the courts to abandon last clear chance after Congress imposed com-
parative negligence; Chicago, M., St. P. &: P. R. Co. v. Kane, note 8 supra; Deere v. 
Southern Pac. Co., (9th Cir. 1941) 123 F. (2d) 438, cert. den. 315 US. 819 (1942). 
16 See 4 BENEDICT, ADMIRALTY, 6th ed., 262 (1940) and 1959 Supp.. 84; ROBINSON, 
ADMIRALTY 854 (1939). 
17 Oriental Trading &: Transport Co. v. Gulf Oil Corp., note 3 supra. 
lSThe Max Morris, 137 US. I (1890). 
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of damages in collision cases,19 the Supreme Court has allowed unequal 
apportionment in personal injury cases.20 In the absence of any prohibition 
of unequal division for collision, the district courts have the power to 
apportion damages.21 If they would exercise that power, the courts could 
cease using last clear chance to place the total loss upon one of two negligent 
parties. 
Erik Stapper 
19 The Schooner Catharine v. Dickinson, 17 How. (58 U.S.) 170 (1859). 
20 Jacob v. New York City, 315 U.S. 752 (1942); Socony Vacuum Oil Co. v. Smith, 305 
U.S. 424 (1939); The Arizona v. Anelich, 298 U.S. ll0 (1936). 
21 In The Margaret, (3d Cir. 1929) 30 F. (2d) 923 at 928, cert. den. 279 U.S. 862 
(1959), the Third Circuit awarded damages ¼·¾, but later ordered a rehearing for the 
following reason: "Experiencing a growing doubt, not as to the power to make the order 
apportioning damages, but as to its conduct in not literally and respectfully following the 
moiety rule which the Supreme Court has from time to time applied, this court of its 
own motion, called for a rehearing on the sole question of division of damages.'' (Em-
phasis added.) Thereupon the court reinstated the lower court's divided damage de-
cree. See also Socony Vacuum Transp. Co. v. Gypsum Packet Co., note 3 supra. In the 
William J. Tracy, (D.C. N.J. 1952) 105 F. Supp. 910, damages were awarded 2/3-1/3 
without discussion of whether the district court had the power to apportion damages. 
This argument is further developed in Staring, "Contribution and Division of Damages 
in Admiralty and Maritime Cases," 45 CALIF. L. R.Ev. 304 (1957). 
